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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CURTIS C. BOSWORTH and ~ 
DOROTHY BOSWORTH, 
-vs. _Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
GEORGE I. NORMAN, JR., 
and ROBERT SHERMAN 
d/b/a DOWNBEAT BROAD-
CASTING, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
\ Case 
No. 9518 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
The case evolves around the question of the neces-
sity of a seller of real estate to divulge the existence of 
a party wall of a buliding on the real estate to a pur-
chaser. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Second Judicial ·District Court (Judge Charles 
G. Cowley) held the plaintiffs and respondents (seller) 
entitled to specific performance of contract for the sale 
and purchase of real property as against the defense of 
fraud and misrepresentation for sellers' failure to dis-
close the existence of a party wall of the building situate 
on the real property. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The relief sought on this appeal is as follows: 
A. Reversal of lower court's decision. 
B. Ruling of rescission of the contract. 
C. Order directing judgment to be entered in favor 
of defendants on counterclaim for damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs in this action purported to sell a certain 
building and lot located at 2268 Washington Boulevard, 
Ogden, Utah, to defendants under a certain" agreement" 
(Exhibit A) (TRll) for a total purchase price of $30,000. 
00. Defendants gave plaintiffs a check for $5,000.00 (Ex-
hibit B) ( TRll) to be held in escrow until a title insur-
ance policy was issued. The balance was to be paid at the 
rate of $5,000.00 per year, plus interest. The title was to 
be conveyed by "quit claim" deed. Also, in the "agree-
ment'' was the following language: ''Buyers are assured 
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by the sellers at the time of closing that all taxes, encum-
brances, liens, or other possible indebtedness has been 
paid in full and is (their) complete liability." (Exhibit A) 
(TR11) 
The defendant buyers later determined that the north 
wall of the building was subject to a party wall agreement 
(TR52) (Exhibit D-1) (TR33) and that there was a dis-
crepancy as to ownership of the south one inch of the 
property. As a result, defendant could not put the build-
ing to the use to which they had anticipated without pro-
hibitive expense. (TR33, 34, 95, 96) As a result, defend-
ants immediately notified plaintiffs that they could not 
proceed with the" agreement" (TR54) as they could not 
use the property for the purpose for which they were 
purchasing it. In the meantime and before the title insur-
ance policy had been issued (it never was), plaintiffs 
attempted to cash defendants' check on which a stop pay-
ment order had been issued. ( TR25, 26) 
Thereafter and by reason of defendants' inability 
to remodel the building because of the party wall, defend-
ants were unable to conduct their business to their loss 
of $16,000.00 (TR56) in addition to architects' fees in-
curred in the sum of approximately $800.00. (TR36) 
Never at any time did the plaintiffs inform defend-
ants that in fact there was a party wall in existence. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT ON DE-
FENDANTS' MOTION BY REASON OF PLAIN-
TIFFS' FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE EXIST-
ENCE OF THE PARTY WALL. 
POINT II 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
FIND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS ON DE-
FENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM. 
ARGUJ\fENT 
POINT I 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT ON DE-
FENDANTS' MOTION BY REASON OF PLAIN-
TIFFS' FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE EXIST-
ENCE OF THE PARTY WALL. 
It is clear from the evidence and is undisputed that 
the plaintiffs at no time disclosed to the defendants that 
there was in existence a party wall on the building which 
was the subject matter of the contract between the 
parties. The law appears clear that by reason of plain-
tiffs' failure to so disclose concealed material facts, de-
fendants are entitled to a rescission of the agreement and 
the general law we quote as follows: 
23 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit Sec. 50: 
''Title, Ownership and Encumbrances. - The 
general rule is well settled that false statements 
or misrepresentations as to the title, or the char-
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acter of one's title, to real estate, made for the 
purpose of inducing some business transaction or 
dealing in connection therewith, constitute action-
able fraud and may form the basis either for an 
action in tort for damages or for rescission ... '' 
''False statements and misrepresentations as to 
the existence of liens and encumbrances on reality, 
as to liens or encumbrances affecting the interest 
of the representor, or as to the amount of such 
lines or fraud. Thus, a representation that there 
is no encumbrance upon real estate, if false to the 
knowledge of the person making it, constitutes 
actionable fraud if relied upon by the representee 
to his injury. 
"Likewise, a representation that the title to land 
is perfect and free from encumbrances amounts to 
an affirmation of fact insofar as any acts of the 
party making it in respect of the title are con-
cerned, and if false in respect of such acts, is 
ground for rescission although innocently made. 
''or the principle may be invoked that one who 
negotiates for a transaction relating to real prop-
erty is considered by most courts to be under a 
legal duty to know and speak the truth as to his 
title thereto and the encumbrances thereon, and 
he is therefore liable for making false statements 
as to such matters, although he believed his state-
ments to be true, through forgetfulness that he 
had previously sold the property or for any other 
reason which rendered him innocent of intent to 
deceive." 
The underlying philosophy of all the law on this subject 
is stated in 46 Am. Jur., Sales Sec. 98, where, speaking 
of misrepresentations in business transactions such as 
the one at hand, the text states: 
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''The tendency of modern jurisprudence is to 
bring the legal duties of persons engaged in com-
mercial transactions up to the ethical standard of 
conduct.'' 
And, in 23 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit Sec. 24, the law is 
clearly stated to be that misrepresentations may be made 
in any manner: by acts, words, etc. The conclusion of the 
text is that "the mode of falsely representing a matter 
of fact is immaterial". 
The statements as to the law on misrepresentation 
found in Am. Jur. are also found in Utah law relating to 
contracts. In Mawhinney v. Jensen, 232 P. 2d 769, Justice 
Wolfe, holding that the terms of a contract are not bind-
ing in a situation involving fraudulent representations, 
stated: 
"But where it may clearly be shown that the terms 
used in the latter instrument did not correctly 
embody the prior intention of the parties because 
of inadvertence, ambiguity or fraud, evidence as 
to what was really intended by the terms of the 
instrument or what was inadvertently omitted or 
added may be shown by clear and convincing evi-
dence. " (at page 77 4) 
He also recited the general rule as to parol evidence in 
such situations: (Page 775) 
"We also point out that parol evidence is always 
admissible to show fraud, even though it has the 
effect of varying the terms of the written 
contract.'' 
Furthermore, the defendants were justified in rely-
. ing on the sellers' representations, without being under 
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a duty to first investigate the sellers' title. The law is 
found in an extensive annotation in 33 A. L. R. 853, where 
it states: 
"One is not prevented from relying on another's 
statement of his title to real estate as a basis for 
contract, by the fact that the public records give 
him access to such information.'' 
And in the annotated case of Loverin v. Kuhne, 94 Conn. 
219, 108 Atl. 554 (1919) the court states: 
''Every contracting party has an absolute right to 
rely on the express statement of an existing fact, 
the truth of which is known to the opposite party, 
and unknown to him, as the basis of a mutual en-
gagement; and he is under no obligation to investi-
gate and verify statements, to the truth of which 
the other party to the contract, with full means of 
knowledge, has ... pledged his faith.'' 
The same rule is found in 23 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit 
Sec. 167, where it states: 
''Generally speaking, where one represents to 
another in a business transaction that he is the 
owner of certain property or that the property is 
free from encumbrances, such representations may 
be relied on without investigation, especially where 
the representation is in a form calculated to pre-
vent further inquiry.'' 
As previously stated, the policy of the law now is not 
to blindly regard the technical definition of words used 
in a contract as the sole criteria of interpretation or stan-
dard of the legal relation, but to look through the words 
to ascertain the true intent of the parties. Hence, it is 
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further submitted that even apart from the defense of 
fraud based on misrepresentation, appellant defendants 
should not be held to the technical wording of a contract 
which clearly does not express the intention of the parties. 
(A party certainly does not pay $30,000.00, a fair market 
value for a quit claim deed.) This position is clearly up-
held by Professor Williston in 3 Williston, Contracts Sec. 
614, p. 1766 (1936), where he states: 
"It is obvious that this preumption that parties 
know the technical legal meaning of the language 
which they use, and thereupon adopt that meaning, 
may often be very artificial; and it is a reasonable 
expectation and in accordance with the tendencies 
of the law that the disposition of courts will be to 
give language less and less frequently an artifi-
cial meaning at variance with the apparent inten-
tion of the parties.'' 
POINT II 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
FIND IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS ON DE-
FENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIM. 
There is no evidence to the contrary that defendants 
were damaged by reason of their inability to use the prop-
erty for its intended use and there is no evidence to the 
contrary that defendants were damaged in the sum of 
$16,000.00. It is, therefore, contended that defendants 
should be awarded judgment in that sum. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument and authorities, it 
appears clear that this Court should reverse the decision 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and judgment of the District Court and should find the 
issues in favor of the defendants and should direct the 
lower Court to enter judgment in favor of the defendants 
on their counter-claim against the plaintiffs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
TEL CHARLIER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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